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1 Introduction
The Great Moderation, the reduction in volatility observed in most macro variables since the
mid-1980s, makes it difficult to explain macroeconomic dynamics in the US over the last 40
years within a linear homoskedastic framework. There is still no consensus on whether the
Great Moderation represents a structural break or rather a persistent but temporary change
in regime. The causes also remain the subject of much debate. Was the Great Moderation
the result of a reduction in the volatility of economic shocks, or was it brought about by a
change in the propagation of shocks, for instance through a more aggressive monetary policy?
Articles in favor of the “shock explanation” include McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000),
Sims and Zha (2006), Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2010); articles in favor of the policy channel
include Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999) and Gal´ı and Gambetti (2008). Nevertheless, there
is empirical evidence of both changes in the variance of economic shocks (Sims and Zha
(2006)) and persistent changes in monetary policy (see Cogley and Sargent (2005), Boivin
(2006), and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)), necessitating an empirical framework that can
accommodate both.
In this article, we estimate a standard New-Keynesian model accommodating regime
changes in systematic monetary policy, in the variance of discretionary monetary policy
shocks and in the variance of economic shocks. Whereas the model implies the presence of
recurring regimes, it can also produce near permanent changes in regime. With the structural
model, we can revisit the timing of the onset of the Great Moderation, and it so happens, also
its demise. Moreover, we can then trace the sources of changes in the volatility of macroeco-
nomic outcomes to changes in the volatility of demand, supply and discretionary monetary
policy shocks, and to changes in systematic monetary policy. We find that output and in-
flation shocks moved to a lower variability regime in 1985 and 1990, respectively, but move
back to the higher variability regime towards the end of 2008. Systematic monetary policy
became more active after 1980, whereas discretionary monetary policy shocks were much
less frequent after 19851. The aggressive lowering of interest rates in the 2000-2005 period
preceding the recent financial crisis is characterized as an activist regime. Put together, we
identify the 1980-2005 period as a period with substantially lower output and inflation vari-
ability. From several perspectives, including counterfactual analysis, monetary policy was a
critical driver of the Great Moderation.
The estimation of a New-Keynesian (NK) model accommodating regime switches is com-
1Throughout the article we use active or activist policy to indicate the monetary policy regime where the
interest rate reacts to expected inflation more than one to one, in contrast to passive monetary policy.
1
plicated. In these models, as in most macro models, agents exhibit Rational Expectations,
using all the variables, parameters and structure present in the model to form their expec-
tations. While we retain the elegance of the theoretical Rational Expectations model, we
make use of survey forecasts for inflation and GDP in the estimation. Ang, Bekaert, and
Wei (2007) show that survey expectations beat any other model in forecasting future infla-
tion out of sample. The use of survey forecasts not only brings additional information to
bear on a complex estimation problem, but also simplifies the identification of the regimes
under certain assumptions. In the extant literature, survey forecasts have mostly been used
to provide alternative estimates of the Phillips curve (see Roberts (1995) and Adam and
Padula (2003)). Instead, we study the role of survey expectations in shaping macroeconomic
dynamics in the context of a standard NK model, accommodating regime switches.
There are only a handful of DSGE models that incorporate regime-switching and time
variation of structural parameters, including Bikbov and Chernov (2008), Bianchi (2010),
and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2010). These articles use
very different identification strategies, and do not make use of survey expectations. Apart
from our modelling differences, which we discuss further in the model section, our analysis of
the rational expectations equilibrium in a Markov-switching New-Keynesian model extends
Davig and Leeper (2007) to an empirically more realistic setting.
Section 2 describes the New-Keynesian model, detailing the role of regime-switching
and expectations formation. Section 3 discusses the data used and describes the estima-
tion method employed. Section 4 presents the empirical results, emphasizing the parameter
estimates and the identified regimes. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The basic New-Keynesian model
While our methodology is more generally useful, we focus attention on the following three-
variable-three-equation New-Keynesian macro model, a benchmark of much recent monetary
policy and macroeconomic analysis:
pit = δEtpit+1 + (1− δ)pit−1 + λyt + ²pi,t, ²pi,t ∼ N(0, σ2pi) (1)
yt = µEtyt+1 + (1− µ)yt−1 − φ(it − Etpit+1) + ²y,t, ²y,t ∼ N(0, σ2y) (2)
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)[βEtpit+1 + γyt] + ²i,t, ²i,t,∼ N(0, σ2i ) (3)
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where pit is the inflation rate, yt is the output gap and it is the nominal interest rate.
Et is the conditional expectations operator. The three equations are subject to aggregate
supply (AS), aggregate demand (IS) and monetary policy shocks, respectively. We denote
these shocks by ²pi,t (AS-shock), ²y,t (IS-shock), and ²i,t (monetary policy shock). The δ and
µ parameters represent the degree of forward-looking behavior in the AS and IS equation,
respectively, and if they are not equal to one the model features endogenous persistence. The
φ parameter measures the impact of changes in real interest rates on output and λ the effect
of output on inflation. The monetary policy reaction function is a forward-looking Taylor
rule with smoothing parameter ρ. While policy rules featuring contemporaneous rather than
expected inflation are still popular (see e.g. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and
Rubio-Ramı´rez (2010)), it is well accepted that policy makers consider expected measures of
inflation in their policy decisions (see Bernanke (2010), Boivin and Giannoni (2006)). Policy
should not react to temporary shocks that affect the contemporaneous rate of inflation, but
not the future path of inflation.
The model is a simple example of a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
macro model, characterized by a set of difference equations where today’s decisions are a
function of expected future macro variables as well as lags of the endogenous variables. These
equations represent the log-linearized first-order conditions of the optimizing problems faced
by a representative agent, firms, and the monetary authority. In matrix form, the model can
be expressed as:
AXt = BEtXt+1 +DXt−1 + ²t ²t ∼ N(0,Σ) (4)
where Xt is the vector of macro variables and ²t is the vector of structural macro shocks.
A,B, andD are matrices of structural parameters and Σ is the diagonal variance matrix of ²t.
Throughout this article, we focus on a rational expectations equilibrium (REE, henceforth)
that depends only on the minimum state variables following McCallum (1983), also referred
to as a fundamental solution. The solution to model (4) then follows a VAR(1) law of motion:
Xt = ΩXt−1 + Γ²t (5)
where Ω and Γ are highly non-linear functions of the structural parameters, which can
be solved following Klein (2000), Sims (2002), or Cho and Moreno (2011). We postpone
discussion of the characterization of the rational expectations equilibria to Section 2.3.
The vast majority of structural macro models are rejected on the basis of formal likelihood-
ratio tests. While there are many potential reasons for these rejections, we focus on two. First,
there is considerable evidence of parameter instability. As noted by Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler
3
(1999), the monetary authority may have learned over time to react more aggressively to
inflation deviations from target in order to tame output and inflation fluctuations, leading
to instability in the systematic monetary policy parameters. In addition, the Great Modera-
tion literature (McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2007), and Sims and Zha (2006)) shows that the output
shocks identified in both reduced-form and structural models are heteroskedastic, displaying
a pronounced decline after the mid 1980s. As a result, econometricians have tried to accom-
modate these parameter changes through subsample analysis (Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler
(1999), Moreno (2004), and Boivin and Giannoni (2006)), time varying structural parameter
and volatility estimation (Kim and Nelson (2006), Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez
(2007), Ang, Boivin, Dong, and Loo-Kung (2010)) or through regime-switching models (Bik-
bov and Chernov (2008) and Sims and Zha (2006)). We incorporate regime-switching be-
havior in both systematic monetary policy and the variances of the structural shocks. The
other parameters are assumed time invariant because they arise from micro-founded models.
Second, the rational expectations assumption may constrain the ability of the current
generation of macro models to characterize macro dynamics. Chief among these shortcom-
ings is the fact that agents only employ the variables used to construct the model in forming
expectations of future macro variables. Given that most macro models only use a limited
number of variables, the information sets used by RE agents seem to be unrealistically con-
strained2. There are a number of potential avenues to overcome this problem. The generalized
method of moments (GMM) allows researchers to condition the estimation of model param-
eters on information sets which include additional variables to those implied by the model
(see, for instance, Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999)). Boivin and Giannoni (2008) estimate
a DSGE RE macro model, enhancing the information set available to agents for decision
making purposes with a large number of macro variables governed by a factor structure.
Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010), Bikbov and Chernov (2008), and Rudebusch and Wu
(2008) use term structure data to help identify a New-Keynesian macro model. The work of
Bikbov and Chernov (2008) is most closely related to ours, as they also allow regime shifts in
2Moreover, RE imply that all agents have a perfect knowledge of the model and only adjust their ex-
pectations in reaction to the model dynamics in order to reach the equilibrium, leaving no room for any
alternative perceptions or mechanisms which in practice would likely alter their decisions. According to
Solow (2004) and Phelps (2007), this tight endogeneity of the RE framework may impair its ability to ex-
plain macro dynamics. On the theoretical side, De Grauwe (2008) develops a DSGE model where agents
exhibit bounded rationality, whereas Sims (2005) introduces the rational inattention concept, relaxing some
of the RE assumptions. In addition, Onatski and Stock (2002), among others, develop techniques to per-
form policy analysis in the presence of model, parameter and shock uncertainty around a reference model,
thus leaving some room for macro realizations to deviate from a benchmark model with perfectly known
parameters and forcing processes.
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the shock variances and systematic monetary policy. However, their identification strategy is
very different, as they use term structure data and an exogenous pricing kernel (inconsistent
with the IS curve) to price the term structure.
Instead, we use survey-based expectations (SBE) to help identify the parameters of a
DSGE macro model. SBE reflect the direct answers of a large number of economic agents
to questions about the expected future path of macroeconomic variables. Unlike RE, SBE
are thus not model conditioned and naturally reflect the different perceptions of economic
agents based on a potentially very rich information set. Recently, several authors (Roberts
(1995), Adam and Padula (2003) and Nunes (2007)) have estimated New-Keynesian Phillips
curves using SBE. The results of these efforts have overall been positive, as the estimate of the
important Phillips curve parameter, linking inflation to the output gap, becomes statistically
significant under SBE, in contrast to the results produced by most RE models. Nevertheless,
the use of SBE in DSGE macro models has been limited to date and restricted to single-
equation estimation. Of course, there is much skepticism about SBE: agents may not be truth-
telling or may omit important information in forming forecasts of future macro variables.
However, Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) show that SBE of inflation predict inflation out-
of-sample better than a large number of the standard structural and reduced-form inflation
models proposed in the literature3. Consequently, SBE likely contain important information
about future macro variables. We show below that incorporating SBE greatly facilitates the
computation of the likelihood function and thus the identification of the regime shifts.
2.2 Introducing regime switches
We postulate the presence of 4 regime variables, to model regime shifts in the nature of sys-
tematic monetary policy and in the variances of the structural shocks. The first variable smpt
switches β and γ in equation (3), which represent the systematic monetary policy parame-
ters. The second variable spit shifts the volatility of the aggregate supply shocks. The third
variable syt shifts the volatility of the IS shocks. The fourth variable s
i
t affects the volatility
of the monetary policy shock. These variables can take on two values and follow Markov
chains with constant transition probabilities in the Hamilton (1989) tradition. The agents
are assumed to know the regime at each point in time so that learning issues are dispensed
with. In particular, agents rationally account for potential future regime shifts in monetary
policy, when taking expectations. We assume that the regime variables are independent. For
3Boivin (2006), for instance, uses the Greenbook forecasts employed before each FOMC meeting by the
Fed in order to identify changes in its stance against inflation. These forecasts include information from a
wide range of sources, including forecasters’ opinions.
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future reference, let St = (s
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t , s
pi
t , s
y
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i
t).
The regime-dependent volatility model for the three shocks in equation (4) simply allows
for two different values of the conditional variance, as a function of the regime variable. For
example, for the AS equation, we have:
V ar (²pi,t|Xt−1, St) = σ2pi (spit ) = exp (αpi,0 + αpi,1spit ) (6)
with spit = 1, 2 and the exponential function guaranteeing non-negative volatilities. To help
identification, we impose σ2pi (s
pi
t = 1) > σ
2
pi (s
pi
t = 2) , σ
2
y (s
y
t = 1) > σ
2
y (s
y
t = 2) , σ
2
i (s
i
t = 1) >
σ2i (s
i
t = 2).
The regime variable smpt accommodates potential persistent shifts in the systematic policy
parameters β and γ. In particular, we expect to find an activist regime with β larger than
1 and a passive regime with β smaller than 1. A number of economists (Clarida, Gal´ı, and
Gertler (1999), Boivin and Giannoni (2006)) suggest that β experienced a structural break
around 1980, with β being lower than 1 before and larger thereafter. While we find such
a model ex ante implausible, it can still be approximated by our regime-switching model
if the regimes are very persistent with very small transition probabilities. Nevertheless, in
our model, a switch to a new regime is never viewed as permanent. If regime classification
yields a passive regime 100% of the time before 1980, and an activist regime 100% of the
time afterwards, the permanent break hypothesis surely gains credence relative to a model
of persistent but non-permanent changes in policy. It is also possible that the influential
1979-1982 Volcker period affects inference substantially. Was this period the first switch
into a more active regime or is it best viewed as a period of discretionary contractionary
policy? By letting the variable sit affect the variability of the monetary policy shock, we also
accommodate the latter possibility.
Incorporating the regime variables, equation (4) becomes:
A(St)Xt = B(St)EtXt+1 +DXt−1 + ²t ²t ∼ N(0,Σ(St)) (7)
where A(St) and B(St) capture the regime-switching behavior of the central bank and Σ(St)
governs the time-varying volatilities of the structural shocks. With regimes affecting both
systematic monetary policy and the variance of shocks, we can use the model to revisit the
question of what drove down inflation and output growth variability during the 1980s and
1990s: was it policy or luck (see e.g. Stock and Watson (2002) and Blanchard and Simon
(2001))? A large literature has examined this issue from both reduced-form (Cogley and
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Sargent (2005), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Sims and Zha (2006)) and structural
(Moreno (2004), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Boivin and Giannoni (2006)) perspectives.
Disagreement remains. For instance, Benati and Surico (2009) show that the results of Sims
and Zha (2006), suggesting a prominent role for heteroskedasticity, may be biased against
finding a role for policy changes. The combination of a structural New-Keynesian model
with regime shifts in both monetary policy parameters and shock variables can provide
novel evidence on the sources of macroeconomic dynamics.
Our model fits into a rapidly growing body of work incorporating policy changes and/or
heteroskedasticity into New-Keynesian models. Part of this literature is more theoretical
in nature, considering issues of equilibrium existence and stability, in models that are not
likely to be empirically successful. We discuss this important literature in Section 2.3. The
empirical literature on DSGEs with time-varying parameter and shock distribution is very
recent. Some authors, such as Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2007) and Justini-
ano and Primiceri (2008), postulate heteroskedastic variances and fixed structural parame-
ters in their DSGEs, whereas Davig and Doh (2008) develop a New-Keynesian model with
regime-switching parameters but constant shock variances. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-
Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2010), Bianchi (2010) and Bikbov and Chernov (2008) allow
for time variation in both the structural shock variances and the systematic part of their
RE New-Keynesian macro models, and are thus closest to our framework. Bianchi (2010)
has a three equation - three variable model, such as ours, but uses only one regime variable
to accomodate heteroskedasticity. We show below that this is overly restrictive. Our use of
SBE also allows for a much simpler estimation method than is possible in Bianchi (2010).
2.3 The rational expectations equilibrium under regime-switching
A linear rational expectations model (4) is said to be determinate if it has a unique and
stable (non-explosive) equilibrium, which takes the form of a fundamental REE as in equa-
tion (5). In case of indeterminacy, the models generally have multiple fundamental and
non-fundamental (“sunspot”) equilibria. It is also now well-understood that a violation of
the Taylor principle, typically identified as β being less than 1 in equation (3), leads to
indeterminate equilibria in the prototypical New-Keynesian model. Intuitively, raising the
short-term nominal interest rate less than one for one to an increase in (expected) inflation
actually lowers the real rate, fueling inflation even more through output gap expansion and
the Phillips curve mechanism. However, the US data seem to suggest a structural break in
β, with β lower than 1 (“passive policy’) before 1980 and higher than 1 (“active policy”)
afterwards (Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999), Boivin and Giannoni (2006)). From the per-
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spective of a standard New-Keynesian model, this implies that the propagation system was
not uniquely determined before 1980 and/or that non-fundamental (sunspot) equilibria may
have played a role before 1980 (see Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)).
Recently, Davig and Leeper (2007) generalized the Taylor principle to a baseline New-
Keynesian macro model with regime-switching in monetary policy, which is nested in the
model of equation (7). Specifically, they show that the model can have a unique bounded
equilibrium even when the central bank is temporarily passive as long as there is a positive
probability that the passive regime switches to the active regime, and the structural shocks
are bounded. Consequently, a Markov-switching rational expectations model (MSRE for
short), apart from being more economically reasonable than a permanent break model, offers
the potential to explain US macro-dynamics, even before 1980, in the context of a model
with a unique and stable equilibrium.
It should be stressed that determinacy for MSRE models has not been completely char-
acterized. The debate between Davig and Leeper (2007) and Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha
(2009), for example, shows that standard determinacy conditions do not always easily gen-
eralize to MSRE models. The main reason is that, in contrast to linear models, boundedness
in mean and boundedness in variance represent different stability concepts in MSRE mod-
els. Moreover, the extant work on determinacy does not apply to our model, as our model
features predetermined variables, which are absent in the MSRE models analyzed thus far
in the literature.
Instead, our approach circumvents this debate by focusing on the “forward solution,”
introduced by Cho and Moreno (2011). In a nutshell, the forward solution results from
solving a linear RE model recursively forward. If a forward solution exists, the parameters
multiplying the state variables converge, and hence, the recursion also yields the actual fun-
damental equilibrium. Cho and Moreno (2011) show that the forward solution is the unique
fundamental solution that satisfies the no-bubble (or transversality) condition; the condition
that makes expectations of future endogenous variables converge to zero. Consequently, the
forward solution selects an economically reasonable fundamental equilibrium, irrespective
of determinacy and delivers the numerical solution in one step. Importantly, Cho (2010)
shows that this logic carries over to MSRE models. In particular, the forward solution to the
Markov-switching model (7) follows the law of motion:
Xt = Ω(St)Xt−1 + Γ(St)²t ²t ∼ N(0,Σ(St)), (8)
which depends only on the state variables, Xt−1 and the current state St in a nonlinear
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fashion. Hence, there are as many “different” reduced-form solutions as there are combina-
tions of regimes. This is the methodology we follow to both compute and select the REE for
our model. Consequently, our analysis excludes non-fundamental equilibrium solutions and
fundamental solutions that violate the transversality condition.
Because REE in MSRE models as general as ours have not been examined before (and
to aid our practical estimation), we conducted an extensive study of the existence of REE
for different parameter configurations. The analysis is described in more detail in Appendix
A, but we provide a short summary of the major findings here. Essentially, we conduct a
grid search over an extensive parameter range, and verify whether we can characterize the
set of parameters for which a fundamental forward solution exists. This proved a non-trivial
task and no simple characterization is possible. However, the most critical parameters in
driving the existence of a REE clearly are (δ, µ, β1, β2). Recall that β1 > β2, identifying
the first regime as the “active” regime. Not surprisingly, given Davig and Leeper’s work, an
equilibrium can still exist with β2 smaller than 1, and β1 larger than 1. Values of µ and δ
smaller than 0.5 will lead to non-existence, but equilibrium may exist if only one of the two
is smaller than 0.5 (and the other one relatively high).
We use this information to consider a restricted parameter space in estimation (see more
below). Nevertheless, estimating the model in Equations (7)-(8) remains difficult. In order
to construct the likelihood function, we must not only integrate across all combinations of
potential (unobserved) regimes, but also numerically compute the highly non-linear reduced-
form coefficient matrices (Ω(St) and Γ(St)) for all combinations of potential regimes. We
circumvent this problem and simultaneously bring additional information to bear on the
estimation by incorporating survey forecasts, as we show in the next subsection.
2.4 Introducing survey expectations
Undoubtedly, the information used by professional forecasters greatly exceeds the informa-
tion set spanned by the variables present in the simple model in equations (1)-(3). Given
that survey expectations outperform empirical and theoretical models predicting inflation,
they can also prove useful in estimating macroeconomic parameters and dynamics. To in-
corporate SBE into the model, we assume that survey expectations of inflation and output
obey the following law of motion:
pift = αEtpit+1 + (1− α)pift−1 + wpit (9)
yft = αEtyt+1 + (1− α)yft−1 + wyt (10)
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with wpit ∼ N
(
0, σpif
)
and wyt ∼ N
(
0, σyf
)
. Consequently, survey expectations potentially
react to true rational expectations one for one if α equals 1, but may also slowly adjust to
true rational expectations and depend on past survey expectations. This is reminiscent of
Mankiw and Reis (2002)’s model of the Phillips curve, in which information dissiminates
slowly throughout the population.
In our model, we combine the determination of SBE with the regime-switching counter-
parts of equations (1)-(3). That is, we retain the assumption of rational expectations, and
simply use additional information to identify both the structural parameters and the regimes
in a 5 variable system. Nevertheless, the estimation remains complex as we still need to solve
the rational expectations equilibrium at each step in the optimization and for all possible
regime combinations. If we let the variance of the shocks in equations (9)-(10) go to zero,
so that SBE are an exact function of past SBE and current RE, we can greatly simplify
estimation. In this case, we can infer the RE of inflation and output from equations (9) and
(10) and substitute them into the main model equations to obtain:
pit =
δ
α
(pift − (1− α)pift−1) + (1− δ)pit−1 + λyt + ²pi,t ²pi,t ∼ N(0, σ2pi(spit )) (11)
yt =
µ
α
(yft − (1− α)yft−1) + (1− µ)yt−1 − φit +
φ
α
(pift − (1− α)pift−1) + ²y,t
²y,t ∼ N(0, σ2y(syt )) (12)
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)[β(s
mp
t )
α
(pift − (1− α)pift−1) + γ(smpt )yt] + ²i,t (13)
²i,t ∼ N(0, σ2i (sit)) (14)
Note that when α = 1, the RE are assumed equivalent with SBE. The parameter α generally
measures the relative weight of RE and past SBE in expectation formation for professional
forecasters.
Let Xft =
[
pift y
f
t
]′
. In matrix form, the regime-switching New-Keynesian model be-
comes:
A(St)Xt = B(St)X
f
t +D(St)X
f
t−1 + FXt−1 + ²t ²t ∼ N(0,Σ(St)) (15)
with:
A(St) =
 1 −λ 00 1 φ
0 −(1− ρ)γ(smpt ) 1
 , B(St) =

δ
α
0
φ
α
µ
α
(1−ρ)
α
β(smpt ) 0
 ,
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D(St) =
 −
δ(1−α)
α
0
−φ(1−α)
α
−µ(1−α)
α
−(1−ρ)(1−α)
α
β(smpt ) 0
 , F =
 (1− δ) 0 00 (1− µ) 0
0 0 ρ
 ,
and conditional on α 6= 0,
Σ(St) =
 σAS(s
pi
t ) 0 0
0 σIS(s
y
t ) 0
0 0 σMP (s
i
t)
 .
This model leads to the following reduced-form:
Xt = Ω1(St)X
f
t−1 + Ω2(St)X
f
t + Ω3(St)Xt−1 + Γ(St)²t ²t ∼ N(0,Σ(St)), (16)
with Ω1(St) = A(St)
−1B(St), Ω2(St) = A(St)−1D(St), Ω3(St) = A(St)−1F and Γ(St) =
A(St)
−1. A major advantage of this approach is that the matrices determining the law of
motion of Xt are simple analytical functions of the structural parameters, thus making the
likelihood function much easier to compute, simplifying estimation. There is no need to
compute the REE at each step in the optimization of the likelihood, and the regimes can
be inferred as in the standard reduced-form multivariate models (see Hamilton (1989) and
Sims and Zha (2006)). Importantly, SBE adds new information, absent in the variables and
structure of the New-Keynesian model, to aid parameter estimation.
3 Data and Estimation
The model requires analogs for five variables: inflation, the output gap, the short-term in-
terest rate, and survey-based estimates of expected inflation and the expected output gap.
Inflation is measured as the log-difference of the chain-type Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
deflator price index. The output measure is real GDP and we employ a quadratic trend to
measure potential output. We report results for the output gap measure computed using
a quadratic trend. We retrieve both the GDP and GDP deflator data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis database. Expected inflation is the median survey responses of expected
GDP inflation over the next quarter. To construct the expected output gap, we use current
GDP and expected GDP growth over the next quarter. We again use the median survey
response to proxy for expected GDP growth. The series is then appropriately detrended.
Both expected inflation and output are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)
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published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Finally, the short-term interest rate
is the 3-month treasury bill (secondary market rate). The data frequency is quarterly and our
sample period goes from the fourth quarter of 1968 to the second quarter of 2008. Appendix
B has more details on the data.
The model in (16) is estimated via limited information maximum likelihood, given that
we do not use the pift and y
f
t equations. The information set It−1 consists of all the available
information up to time t − 1: It−1 = {Qt−1, Qt−2, . . . , Q0}, where Qt = [Xt Xft ]′.
The full dataset is thus Q˜T = [QT , QT−1, . . . , Q0]. We denote the parameters to be
estimated as θ, so that the aim is to maximize the density function f(Q˜T ; θ). While agents in
the economy observe the regime variables, St, the econometrician does not and only has data
on Qt. Therefore, we maximize the likelihood function for Q˜T , integrating out the dependence
on St, as is typical in the regime-switching literature
4.
We would like the estimation to produce parameters for which a fundamental rational
expectations equilibrium exists. To do so, we proceed in two steps. First, we use the analysis
of Section 2.3 to construct a compact parameter space that attempts to exclude regions
where REE are unlikely to exist. Because of the non-convexity of the set, we use a rather
wide parameter space (details are available upon request), that encompasses the parameter
values yielding a REE. Second, at each step in the optimization, we verify whether the
forward solution exists. If not, the likelihood function is penalized, steering optimization
away from such regions in the parameter space.
Appendix C describes the different specification tests that we perform on the residuals
of the model. First, for each equation, we test the hypotheses of a zero mean and zero
serial correlation (up to two lags) of the residuals (the “mean test”); unit mean and zero
serial correlation (two lags) for the squared standardized residuals (the “variance test”);
zero skewness, and appropriate kurtosis. In performing these tests, we recognize that the
test statistics may be biased in small samples, especially if the data generating process is as
non-linear as the model is above. Therefore, we use critical values from a small Monte Carlo
analysis also described in Appendix C. Second, the economic model should also capture
the correlation between the various variables. We test for each residual whether its joint
covariances with all other residuals are indeed zero. We also perform a joint test for all
covariances. As in the first set of tests, we obtain critical values from a small Monte Carlo
analysis.
4We sacrifice full efficiency by ignoring f(Xft |It−1; θ) in the estimation. Technically, this requires assuming
f(Xft |St = st, It−1; θ) = f(Xft |It−1; θ). While not very palatable at first, in our model, the regimes can in
principle be identified without using survey data, so that the assumption is implicitly valid.
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Table 1 reports Monte Carlo p-values of all these tests for our main model, on the left
hand side. The residual levels and variances are well behaved, with the exception of the
output gap, where the test uncovers some remaining autocorrelation in the residuals. The
regime-switching model is able to capture most skewness and kurtosis in the data, only
failing the zero skewness test for inflation. The model’s weakest point appears to be the fit
of covariances between the three shocks. The last two lines in Table 1 reveal that the model
fails to fully capture the correlation structure between the various economic variables.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Parameter estimates
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates of the RS DSGE New-Keynesian macro model
yielding a stable and determinate RE equilibrium, as described in Section 2.3. It also shows
a number of statistical tests of parameter equality. All parameters have the right sign and
are statistically significant, but we did constrain the φ coefficient to a positive value of 0.1.
As is common in maximum likelihood estimation of this class of New-Keynesian models,
unconstrained estimation yields either negative or very small and insignificant estimates of
φ (see Ireland (2001), Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) and Cho and Moreno (2006)).
In the AS equation, δ is 0.425, implying a similar weight on the forward-looking and
endogenous persistence terms. The IS equation is more forward looking, since µ is 0.675.
Given the small standard errors of these parameters, our estimation reveals strong evidence
in favor of endogenous persistence.
The Phillips curve parameter λ is large at 0.102, implying a strong transmission mecha-
nism from output to inflation and thus a strong monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Previous estimations of rational expectations models fail to obtain reasonable and significant
estimates of λ with quarterly data (Fuhrer and Moore (1995)). Some alternative estimations
have yielded significant estimates, such as Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) who use a measure for
marginal cost replacing the output gap; Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010) who identify a
natural rate of output process from term structure data; or Roberts (1995) and Adam and
Padula (2003) who use SBE but in a single equation context with fixed regimes. However,
our estimate is even larger than the coefficients reported in these articles. We conjecture that
the introduction of slow moving SBE of inflation generates additional correlation between
(expected) inflation and the output gap.
Regarding the monetary policy rule, the interest rate persistence is large, 0.834, in agree-
13
ment with most studies in the literature (Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), Bekaert, Cho
and Moreno (2010), among others). Our estimation allows for regime switches in the key
monetary policy parameters, β, the response to expected inflation, and γ, the response to
the output gap. In the “activist” regime, β is 2.312, well above 1 statistically, whereas in
the passive regime, β is 0.598, significantly below 1. Thus, our estimation clearly identifies a
sharp economic and statistical difference in the response to inflation across monetary policy
regimes. In their single equation monetary policy rule estimation, Davig and Leeper (2005)
also estimate a significant difference between β’s across regimes, but of a smaller magnitude
than our estimates. The contemporaneous articles of Bikbov and Chernov (2008) and Bianchi
(2010), estimating Markov Switching RE New-Keynesian models, also identify a large differ-
ence in β across regimes. The interest rate response to the output gap, γ, is higher than in
the aforementioned estimations (1.187 and 0.687, respectively), and it is larger in the more
“activist” regime, although not in a statistically significant way.
Finally, α, the parameter governing the law of motion for the survey-based expectations,
is 0.986, meaning that SBE adjust almost completely to RE. We examine below whether
this finding is the result of imposing rational expectations on the estimation. Because the
other parameters are directly related to the identification of the regimes, we discuss them in
the next sub-section.
4.2 Macroeconomic regimes
Perhaps the key output of our model is the identification of macroeconomic regimes. The
volatility parameters imply strong evidence of time-varying variances in macroeconomic
shocks. For the output gap and inflation shocks, volatility in the high volatility regime is
around double that in the low volatility regime. However, for interest rates, the high volatil-
ity regime features volatility that is about 6 times as high as in quiet times, suggesting a
potentially important role for discretionary monetary policy. Because interest rates are mea-
sured in quarterly percent, the volatility of interest rate shocks in the low volatility state is
very small (0.04%), implying a strict commitment to the monetary policy rule.
The transition probability coefficients imply overall quite persistent regimes. For inflation,
the expected duration of the high variance regime is very high at 100 quarters, but the low
variance regime is persistent as well. Output gap regimes are somewhat less persistent, with
the high variance regime expected to last about 27 quarters, while discretionary interest rate
regimes are much less persistent, with the high interest rate variability regime expected to
last about 8 quarters. Accommodating monetary policy regimes last on average longer than
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activist regimes, which are short-lived lasting on average 7 quarters.
These transition probabilities are important inputs in the identification of the time path
of the regimes. Figure 1 plots the smoothed probabilities for the four independent regime
variables. Panel A shows the smoothed probabilities of respectively the high inflation shock
volatility regime and the high output shock volatility regime. Note that the regime proba-
bilities tend to be either close to one or zero, indicating adequate regime identification. We
observe a sudden drop in output shock volatility starting in 1981 and fully materializing
in 1985. The decreased volatility persists until 2007, coinciding with the onset of the credit
crisis. The variability of inflation shocks starts to decrease later, with the smoothed proba-
bility going below 0.5 at the beginning of 1986, and going toward zero just before the 1990
recession. Signs of a reversal in the low variability regime are already visible in 2003, with its
probability reaching less than 50 percent in the third quarter of 2006 already. Our evidence
in favor of a switch towards a higher variability regime is stronger and its timing earlier than
in Bikbov and Chernov (2008).
Panel B shows the smoothed probabilities of respectively the active monetary policy
regime in which the Fed aggressively stabilizes inflation, and the high volatility regime for
interest rate shocks. The high interest rate volatility regime occurs quite frequently and is
always on during recessions, including during the 1980-1982 Volcker period. This implies that
in times of recession, the Fed is more willing to deviate from the interest rate rule. Bikbov
and Chernov (2008) also categorize the Volcker period as a period of discretionary monetary
policy. Unlike their results, we also find systematic monetary policy to be activist during this
period. Interestingly, our model shows that activist monetary policy spells generally became
more frequent from 1980 onwards. We identify the 1993-2000 period as an accommodating
monetary policy stance. Because this period is characterized by relatively low inflation, a
passive monetary policy stance implies relatively high interest rates. One interpretation is
that inflation expectations were firmly anchored, due to the more aggressive stance of the Fed
during the previous decade. In addition, the possibility of switching back to the stabilizing
regime, as captured by our regime switching DSGE, may also anchor inflation expectations.
Notice that this regime identification is quite different from the permanent shift in monetary
policy around 1980, put forward in earlier studies such as Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999)
and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), but consistent with contemporaneous results in Bianchi
(2010) and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2010).
In 2000 there is a switch to the activist regime, as interest rates rapidly declined following
the beginning of the 2000 recession, while inflation stayed low. Hence, according to our
analysis, interest rates in the first 5 years of the previous decade were lower than what
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was prescribed by the Taylor rule (see Taylor (2009)). Bernanke (2010) ascribes this to
the “jobless recovery” experienced at the time, but some may surmise that this aggresive
monetary policy was one of the root causes of the recent credit crisis (see Rajan (2006)). The
recent credit crisis starting in 2007 is preceded by a passive monetary policy regime which,
given the low inflation environment, implies that interest rates increased. In the beginning
of the credit crunch, our model identifies a switch towards both systematic stabilizing and
(expansionary) discretionary monetary policy, leading to a sharp decline of interest rates.
4.3 Impulse responses
A nice feature of our model is that the impulse responses are regime-dependent, and should
differ across regimes. Because agents are assumed to know the regime, we compute the
impulse responses using an information set that incorporates both data and the regime;
they follow from calculating E [Xt+k|It, smpt = i], for i = 1, 2. Appendix D describes a simple
procedure to compute these impulse responses recursively. Note that this computation takes
into account the expectations of agents regarding future switches in the monetary policy
regime.
Figures 2 to 4 produce these regime dependent impulse responses of all three macro-
variables to one-standard deviation shocks, focusing on, respectively, AS, IS and mone-
tary policy shocks. In each figure, there are three panels corresponding to the three macro-
variables. We show 4 different impulse responses, depending on the monetary policy regime
and the shock volatility regime. While the volatility regimes only affect the initial size of
the shock, the relative magnitude of the impulse responses helps us interpret macroeconomic
dynamics in different time periods.
Figure 2 focuses on AS shocks. This is of considerable interest as there is a lively debate
on whether the stagflations of the seventies were partially policy driven. The figure shows
that following an AS shock, inflation is highest in the high volatility passive monetary pol-
icy regime, as was observed in the 1970s, and lowest in the low volatility-activist monetary
policy regime, as observed throughout the 90s. It is especially activist monetary policy that
contributes to a lower inflation response. Investigating output gap responses, a positive AS
shock drives down the output gap in a protracted way under an activist monetary policy
response, because the real interest rate increases. However, the output gap increases when
monetary policy is accommodating as then the real interest rate decreases following a positive
AS shock. However, after about 6-7 quarters, the output gap is lower under an accommodat-
ing regime than it is under an activist regime. The effect of AS shocks on nominal interest
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rates is also strikingly regime-dependent. Except for the initial periods, the accommodating
regime yields higher nominal interest rate responses than the activist regime. This is because
under accommodating monetary policy, it takes time for inflation to decrease - both through
the direct effect of monetary policy and through expectations -, so that interest rates must
be kept high for a long time. The regime-dependent responses therefore provide simultane-
ously an interesting interpretation of the historical record on the macroeconomic response
to the negative aggregate supply shocks in the seventies and a counter-factual analysis. The
accommodating policy regime implied (excessively) high interest rates, high inflation and
high inflation variability and a substantial long term loss in output. The responses under an
activist regime show that an aggressive Fed could have likely lowered the magnitude of the
inflation response, reduced inflation volatility, kept interest rates overall lower and avoided
the longer-term output loss, at the cost of a short-term loss over the first 5 quarters.
Figure 3 shows the responses to the IS shock. The inflation responses are similar across
monetary policy regimes, but move over a wider range under the accommodating regime.
In that regime, inflation rates move substantially below their mean during some periods,
simultaneously with the interest rate undershooting its mean. The output gap responses
are also quite similar across regimes. The similarity of the responses may have something
to do with the fact that monetary policy reacts similarly to demand shocks across both
regimes. While Panel C shows that the interest response to a demand shock is higher in
the activist regime, the response differences are both in absolute and relative terms multiple
times smaller than the responses to supply shocks, observed in Figure 2.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the responses to the monetary policy shock. Clearly, the activist
monetary policy regime implies (much) more stable inflation and output dynamics than the
passive regime. The macroeconomic volatility under the accommodating regime is especially
dramatic when the interest rate shock is in the high volatility regime (recall that the interest
rate shock volatility is multiple times higher in that case). A contractionary monetary policy
shock lowers inflation and the output gap in both regimes, but, as the third panel shows,
this is not only accommodated with less macroeconomic but also less interest rate volatility
in the activist regime.
4.4 Macro-variability and its Sources
US economic history has witnessed profound changes in the volatility of macroeconomic
variables over time, as evidenced by the literature on the Great Moderation. In the context of
our model, this time variation in macroeconomic variability is driven by changing regimes in
17
the variability of macroeconomic shocks (driven by spit , s
y
t , s
i
t) and regime dependent feedback
parameters, which also depend on the monetary policy regime, smpt . In this section, we
derive the unconditional and regime–dependent variances of our macro variables, and provide
different decompositions to shed light on the sources of macroeconomic variability.
4.4.1 A Variance Decomposition
The regime variable St contains 16 different regimes, as each of the four independent regimes,
smpt , s
pi
t , s
y
t and s
i
t has two states. Appendix E shows in detail how to compute the uncondi-
tional variance as a sum of regime-dependent variances:
V ar(Xt) =
S∑
i=1
V ar(Xt|St = i) · Pi (17)
where Pi = Pr(St = i) is the unconditional, ergodic regime probability, and S = 16.Appendix
E also derives closed-form expressions for the regime-dependent variances. We then compute
the contribution of a particular regime of a particular regime to the total variance as:
rx(St = i) =
V ar(xt|St = i)Pi
V ar(xt)
(18)
where xt represents pit, yt or it.
Table 3 reports these ratios together with the long run, ergodic distribution (Pi). For
instance, the regime combination of an active monetary policy and high shock volatility
across all three equations contributes 1.24, 1.98 and 3.17% to the total variance of inflation,
the output gap and the interest rate, respectively. The regimes contributing the most to
the unconditional variance reflect passive monetary policy, the high variability regime for
inflation shocks and the low variability regime for output shocks. The latter is true because
the low variability regime for output occurs more frequently than the high variability regime
(69.81% versus 30.19% in fact), whereas the opposite is true for inflation shocks, where the
high variability regime occurs 68.97% of the time and also for interest rate shocks where the
high variability regime occurs 59.47% of the time.
The most noticeable result is that in all cases, the contribution to total variance of any
variable is much smaller under the active monetary regime than it is under the passive
regime. For instance, when the economy is in the high volatility regime for all shocks, the
active regime contributes only 1.98% to the total variance of the output gap, whereas the
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passive regime contributes 14.31%, about 7.23 times more. Of course, the contribution could
simply be low because the active regime has a much lower probability of occurring. In the
high volatility regimes, the ergodic probability of the active regime is 3.23% while it is 9.16%
under the passive regime, about three times higher. Therefore, even after controlling for
differences in ergodic probatilities, the volatility of the output gap under the active regime
is much smaller than that under the passive regime. This is generally true for all regime
combinations and all the macro-variables.
To see this more explicitly, Table 4 shows variance ratios for the various regimes, that is
the variance in that particular regime relative to the unconditional variance. Strikingly, the
variance ratios for output and inflation variability in the active regime when all the shocks
are in the high variability regime is lower than the variance ratio for the output and inflation
variability in the passive regime when all the shocks are in the low variability regime. This
suggests that the monetary policy regime has a rather important impact on macro-variability
and perhaps an impact that exceeds the impact of the variability of macro shocks.
To compare the relative effect on variability of shocks versus policy, the last line shows
the ratio of the variance in a regime where all macro shocks are in the high variability regime
versus the variance of a regime where all the macro shocks are in the low variability regime.
These ratios obviously depend on the macro variable and the policy regime, but their range
is rather narrow varying between 3.09 and 3.71. To compare this to the effect of monetary
policy, Table 5 shows the ratio of the passive versus active variances, controlling for the
shock variability regimes. It is obvious that policy has a relatively larger effect on output
and inflation variances than do macro shocks. In terms of volatilities (standard deviations),
the passive monetary policy regime leads to macro standard deviations that are about two
to three times as large as macro standard deviations in the active regime.
4.4.2 The Great Moderation
The above computations can also help us identify the start and the end of the Great Mod-
eration. In terms of our covariance stationary model, the Great Moderation is a period in
which the regime-dependent variance is substantially below its unconditional counterpart.
Figure 5 graphs the ratio of an estimate of the regime-dependent variance over time relative
to the unconditional variance for inflation, the output gap and interest rates. To estimate
regime dependent variances, we use the smoothed regime probabilities. That is,
V ar[Xt|IT ] =
S∑
i=1
V ar[Xt|St = i]P [St = i|IT ] (19)
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If regime classification is perfect (that is, the smoothed probabilities are zero or 1), the
summation simply selects one of the 16 regime-dependent variances. Visually, the graph
clearly identifies the Great Moderation lasting from the third quarter of 1980 to the third
quarter of 2004, with inflation and output variability being substantially below the 1 line,
often even being less than 50% of the unconditional variance. Do note that there are short
episodes during the Great Moderation where inflation and particularly output variability
briefly spike up.
Our previous computations suggest that policy played a rather important role in the
Great Moderation. For example, it is striking that we identify the Great Moderation to start
before the shock variabilities move to a higher variability regime. This is, of course, due to a
switch from a passive to active monetary policy regime around 1980. To visualize the effect of
policy on macro-variances, we run a counterfactual analysis. In Figure 6, we graph a volatility
ratio, namely the volatility of the three macro variables, conditional on the monetary policy
regime always being in the passive regime versus the unconditional volatility. That is, when
computing the counterfactual volatility, the underlying variances computation transfers mass
from states where Smpt = 1 to the corresponding state (and its variance) where S
mp
t = 2.
Figure 7 does the opposite computation, it computes the volatility assuming the monetary
policy regime is always activist, and graphs the actual over the activist volatility.
With these two graphs in hand, we can reinterpret the historical evolution of macro-
volatility as generated by our model. In the seventies, macro-volatility was around twice
as high as it could have been, had monetary policy been active (see Figure 7). From 1981
to 1993, active monetary policy managed to reduce macro-volatility substantially - it would
have been 50% to 200% higher otherwise (Figure 6). The relatively subdued macro-variability
after 1993 to around 2000 was due to low variability in the macro shocks, as monetary policy
was passive. Of course, as we have argued before, the earlier aggressive policy stance may
have helped anchor expectations during a rather mild macroeconomic climate. Taking our
model literally, monetary policy could have further reduced macro-volatility by continuing
to be aggressive. Because inflation was low at that time, an active monetary policy would
have meant lower interest rates. The jump in counterfactual volatility around 2000 in Figure
6 is the more dramatic of the two graphs. In other words, if monetary policy had remained
passive, macro-volatilities would have increased substantially. Bernanke’s (2010) speech ex-
plicitly discusses this episode as the Federal Reserve reacting aggressively to a deflation scare,
reducing the interest rate way below what a standard Taylor rule would predict. The period
also witnessed a number of macroeconomic shocks that could have caused macro-volatility
to increase and augmented recession risk, such as the events of September 11, 2001.
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4.5 Robustness checks
To ensure that our results are robust, we consider a few alternative specifications. We sum-
marize some major features of these alternative estimations in Table 6, repeating the main
estimation results in the left column. The first two estimations we consider simply put φ equal
to a different number than the current value of 0.10, namely 0.01 and 0.20. The Phillips curve
parameter, λ, remains large in both cases, and the stark contrast between the expected infla-
tion response parameters in the active and passive monetary policy regimes is preserved. We
also report the start and end of the Great Moderation for the variability of both output and
inflation shocks under the various models. For output, the end of the low volatility regime
is always in the first or second quarter of 2008, but the alternative estimations time the
beginning of the low output shock volatility regime a bit later than our main estimation did.
For inflation, using a smaller φ gives very similar results to the main estimation, but using
φ = 0.20 delays the start of the low volatility regime from the second quarter of 1986 to the
second quarter of 1990, and speeds up its demise by three quarters (from the third quarter
in 2006 to the last one in 2005). Do note that our cut-off for regime classification is 0.5: that
is, as soon the shock volatility regime has a larger than 50% smoothed probability of being
in either regime it is classified as being in that regime. However, when inflation transitions
to a lower volatility regime, the regime probabilities in the models for φ = 0.10 and φ = 0.01
hover around 0.5 for a while, meaning that classification is uncertain. When we use a more
stringent classification of the probability being in either regime being 70%, the start of the
low inflation shock volatility regime is in early 1990 in all three cases. Finally, the last two
rows report the probability of activist spells before and after 1980. For all three model spec-
ifications we find no activist spells before 1980 and an elevated occurrence of activist spells
post 1980.
The second set of columns report the three previous estimations but making γ regime
invariant. The results are very robust, with the remarks about the start of the Great Mod-
eration for inflation shocks being the same as before.
4.6 Rational expectations versus survey expectations
Our estimation imposes a parameter space that ensures the existence of a fundamental
rational expectations equilibrium. What happens if this assumption is relaxed? Table 7
shows the results for the unconstrained estimation. In Table 1, the right-hand side panel
also produces specification tests for this model. The model only performs marginally better
than the constrained model. Moreover, the resulting estimates imply explosive dynamics for
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the RE model. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the parameter estimates are very similar
to those obtained in the constrained estimation. The only significant difference is that µ, the
forward-looking parameter in the IS equation, is now significantly smaller, 0.331, relative
to 0.675 before. This is similar to the values obtained by Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004),
in their systematic single equation estimation in a fixed regime context. Bekaert, Cho, and
Moreno (2010) also estimate a lower value for µ, namely 0.422, but this is coupled with
a high estimate for the degree of forward-looking behavior in the AS equation (δ in our
model). As we have verified through simulation exercises, the combination of low δ and low
µ –maintaining standard values for other parameters - implies the non-existence of a stable
RE equilibrium, both in a fixed regime and in a multiple regime context. In economic terms,
stable RE dynamics require AS and IS equations with a sufficient degree of forward looking
behavior, such that shocks are rapidly absorbed.
Finally, α, the parameter governing the law of motion for the survey-based expectations,
is 0.410 in the unconstrained case, whereas it was 0.986 in the constrained estimation. This
is an important difference. When we enforce a stable RE, RE appear indistinguishable from
SBE, whereas in the unconstrained estimation, SBE slowly adjust to RE, being heavily
influenced by past expectations. In fact, α is statistically indistinguishable from 0.5, im-
plying that rational expectations and past survey-based expectations obtain similar relative
weigths in the expectations formation process. In other words, viewed through the lens of
this macroeconomic model, survey expectations only slowly adjust to rational expectations,
being heavily influenced by past expectations. This is consistent with Mankiw, Reis, and
Wolfers (2003), who show that the adjustment of SBE to the macro environment is grad-
ual. Conversely, the dependence on rational expectations is highly significant, implying that
survey expectations likely convey much information, useful in estimating macroeconomic
parameters and dynamics.
Figure 8 shows the regime probabilities for the unconstrained model, which should be
compared to Figure 1 for the RE model. Focusing first on Panel B, the monetary policy regime
identification, both for systematic and discretionary policy is very similar, qualitatively and
quantitatively, to that in the constrained estimation. In Panel A, we observe some differences
in terms of output shock regime identification. First, the high output volatility prevails
from the beginning of the sample, whereas in the unconstrained estimation this regime
appears more gradually. In addition, the Great Moderation in terms of output volatility
shocks starts abruptly around 1986, which is a few years later than in the constrained
estimation. Second, the low volatility output shock regime already ends in 2000, much earlier
than in the constrained optimization. These differences can be easily understood examining
the transition probabilities of the IS shock regime variable across estimations (see Tables
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2 and 6). The unconstrained estimation shows much more persistence in the high variance
regime and less persistence in the low volatility regime than the constained estimation.
5 Conclusions
In this article, we indentified macroeconomic regimes through the lens of a simple New-
Keynesian model accommodating regime switches in macroeconomic shocks and systematic
monetary policy. We demonstrate that monetary policy has witnessed several spells of activist
policy, which have become more frequent post 1980. Nevertheless, we do not see a permanant
switch from accommodating to activist policy around 1980, but rather occasional switches
back and forth between the two regimes. One reason is that the data suggest an important
and time-varying role for discretionary monetary policy. For example, the Volcker period
is characterized by both activist systematic policy and discretionary active policy. We also
document important changes in the variances of output and volatility shocks. It is no surprise
that we find strong evidence of a “shock variability moderation” occuring around 1985 for
output, whereas for inflation the timing is somewhere between 1985 and 1990. What is new
is that we find strong evidence of this volatility reduction having ended, for output at the
onset of the recent economic crisis (more precisely in 2007), for inflation, earlier in 2005. The
variability of shocks is not the only determinant of macro-variability however. Our model
implies that the effect of monetary policy regimes on macro variability is relatively larger
than the effect of the variability of shocks. When we investigate the time path of the overall
variability of inflation and the output gap, we find that the Great Moderation starts around
1980 and ends in about 2005. During that period, a predominantly active monetary policy
and low variability economic shocks combined to make output and inflation substantially
less variable than unconditional averages would suggest.
Estimating a rational expectations New-Keynesian model with regime switches is very
difficult from a numerical perspective. Our innovation was to expand the information set
with survey expectations on inflation and output growth. By formulating a simple law of
motion for these expectations as a function of the true rational expectations, we could greatly
simplify the likelihood construction. Constraining the parameter space to those parameters
that yield a stable rational expectations equilibrium, we find survey expectations to be
almost equivalent to rational expectations. However, when we relax these constraints, we
find survey expectations to only gradually adjust to rational expectations and the parameters
to be outside the rational expectations equilibrium space. Fortunately, the identification of
regimes remains similar to that obtained in the rational expectations model, except that the
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Great Moderation in terms of output volatility ends much earlier (in 2000!) when identified
from the unconstrained model.
There are two possible interpretations to these different estimation results. One possi-
bility is that agents truly have rational expectations but that our New-Keynesian model is
mis-specified. Perhaps, we need a more intricate natural rate of output process or we must
add investment equations as in Smets and Wouters (2007) to better fit the data. We did
experiment with slightly more complex specifications (e.g. three monetary policy regimes,
state-dependent transition probabilities, correlated regimes) within the confines of the styl-
ized New-Keynesian model, finding little improvement in fit, and no noteworthy new results.
Perhaps some of the parameters we now assume to be time-invariant may also be unsta-
ble. Hofmann, Peersman, and Straub (2010), for instance, indicate that the degree of wage
indexation may vary through time, causing instability in the AS equation. An alternative
possibility is that the assumption of rational expectations is too rigid, and we must build a
model that accommodates the presence of agents with not fully rational expectations. In any
case, we hope this article stimulates the use of survey expectations in building and estimating
macroeconomic models.
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Appendix
A Identifying the Parameter Space of Existence of Fun-
damental REEs
We characterize the parameter configuration for which a REE exists numerically through a
combination of grid search and randomized parameter choices. The parameters of the stan-
dard deviations and the transition probabilities do not matter for the existence of the funda-
mental REE. Hence, it is sufficient to consider the parameters in the AS, IS and MP equa-
tions, plus the transition probabilities of the monetary policy regimes: δ, λ, µ, φ, ρ, β1, β2,
γ1, γ2, P
mp
11 and P
mp
22 with a restriction β1 > β2 where βi = β(s
mp
t = i), γi = γ(s
mp
t = i)
for i = 1, 2, and Pmpij = Pr(s
mp
t+1 = j|smpt = i) for i, j = 1 and 2. This table describes the
parameter ranges we consider:
Parameter Range Parameter Range
δ (0, 1] λ (0,∞)
µ (0, 1] φ (0,∞)
ρ (0, 1)
β1 [1,∞) β2 (0,∞)
γ1 (0,∞) γ2 (0,∞)
Pmp11 (0, 1) P
mp
22 (0, 1)
Let θ indicate a particular parameter vector and Θ the parameter space specified in
the above table. We decompose Θ into the following disjoint subspaces Θ(E) and Θ(NE).
Θ(E) is the space over which a fundamental REE exists and it has finite first moments, and
Θ(NE) = Θ\Θ(E). We refer to Cho (2010) for further details.5 Let Θ(B(E)) be the outer
boundary of Θ(E). So the ultimate goal is to identify Θ(B(E)).
An initial crude grid search and randomization procedure over the whole parameter
space reveals that the parameters in Θ(B(E)) are inter-related in a complicated fashion
and Θ(B(E)) is non-convex. Therefore, identifying and characterizing Θ(B(E)), an 11-
dimensional contour set, is a daunting task. Nevertheless, the initial procedure showed that
δ, µ, β1 and β2 are the most critical parameters determining the existence of REEs. There-
fore, we decompose Θ into two subspaces Θ1 and Θ2 where θ1 = (δ, µ, β1, β2) ∈ Θ1 and
5Unlike linear RE models, the forward solution may not have finite second moments even if it has a finite
first moment.
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θ2 = (λ, φ, ρ, γ1, γ2, P
mp
11 , P
mp
22 ) ∈ Θ2. Then, for a given θ2, we grid-search over Θ1 to identify
Θ(B(E)). It turns out that such a set is locally convex in θ1 for a given θ2. Then we vary θ2
to assess whether Θ(B(E)) is altered. Let’s illustrate this procedure with an example:
Step 1: Fix θ¯2 at (0.05, 0.05, 0.5, 0.1, 0.1, 0.75, 0.5).
Step 2: Choose 10 values for each one of θ1 = (δ, µ, β1, β2). That is, we check the
existence of the forward solution for 10,000 sets of parameters, finding 8,755 sets for which
the forward solution exists. We define the set Θ1(E|θ¯2) = {θ1| The forward solution exists
at (θ1, θ¯2)} and the boundary of this set is Θ1(B(E)|θ¯2).
Step 3: We change one parameter value in θ2 and follow steps 1 and 2 to see how the set
Θ1(B(E)|θ¯2) changes.
It is not possible to tabulate the set Θ(B(E)) in a systematic way. Instead, we verbally
describe our main findings. First, holding other parameters fixed, combinations of high β1(>
1) and low β2(< 1) form the boundary, Θ(B(E)). Hence, a REE can exist in a model where
monetary policy is temporarily passive (β2 < 1). Second, Θ(B(E)) is convex (locally) over
θ1. Third, combinations of high δ(> 0.5) and low µ(< 0.5), or vice versa, lie on the boundary.
The forward solution does not exist for alternative private sector values (low δ(< 0.5) and
low µ(< 0.5)). Fourth, the parameter space Θ(B(E)) is convex over Pmp11 and P
mp
22 , but not
convex over (λ, φ, ρ, γ1, γ2) in θ2. In particular, we are able to derive a lower boundary
for Pmp11 (that is, parameters higher than the boundary are always in Θ(E), and an upper
boundary for Pmp22 .
In general, it is very difficult to compactly describe the parameter space for which the
forward solution exists. The boundary Θ(B(E)) is not convex over all the parameters and
the parameters are very interrelated. Nevertheless, our experiments here help us restrict the
parameter space for the estimation procedure.
B Data Appendix
Our dataset consists of economic state variables for the US. Our sample period is from the
fourth quarter of 1968 to the second quarter of 2008 for a total of 159 observations. The state
variables are seasonally adjusted and expressed in percentages at a quarterly basis. Below
we give details on the exact data sources used and on the way the series are constructed:
1. Output Gap (y): The output measure is real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The gap is computed as the percentage difference
between output and its quadratic trend. The output gap is divided by four to express
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it at a quarterly basis.
2. Expected Output Gap (yf ): The expected output gap is constructed as follows :
Et [yt+1] = Et
[
gt
gt
(
gt+1
trt+1
− 1
)]
= gt
Et
[
gt+1
gt
]
trt+1
− 1
with
gt = level of real GDP at time t
trt = (quadratic) trend value of real GDP at time t.
We use survey-based expectations of real GDP (level) for the current and next quarter
to measure Et
[
gt+1
gt
]
. The source is the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
3. Inflation (pi): Percentage difference in the Gross Domestic Product Chain-type Price
Index, from the U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
4. Expected Inflation (pif ): Median survey reponse of expected growth in the GDP
deflator over the next quarter, from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
5. Nominal Risk-free Rate (i): 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate. The
source is Federal Reserve. The rate is divided by four to express it at a quarterly basis.
The Table below reports summary statistics for the different state variables:
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
yt 0.0083 0.0417 1.3360 -1.5094 0.5496 -0.0302 2.9290
yft -0.0074 0.0748 1.3521 -1.5046 0.5654 -0.0368 2.9736
pit 1.0022 0.7879 3.1137 0.1494 0.6164 1.1872 3.9637
pift 0.9609 0.8091 2.3212 0.3234 0.5029 1.0852 3.2649
it 1.4657 1.3550 3.7550 0.2200 0.7096 0.8295 4.1004
Panel B: Correlations
yt y
f
t pit pi
f
t it
yt 1.00 0.98 0.18 0.06 0.09
yft 0.98 1.00 0.14 -0.01 0.01
pit 0.18 0.14 1.00 0.84 0.57
pift 0.06 -0.01 0.84 1.00 0.77
it 0.09 0.01 0.57 0.77 1.00
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C Specification Tests
The reduced form of the model (see Section 2.4) is given by:
Xt = Ω1(St)X
f
t−1 + Ω2(St)X
f
t + Ω3(St)Xt−1 + Γ(St)²t ²t ∼ N(0,Σ(St)), (C-1)
with Σ being the regime-dependent diagonal variance-covariance matrix for the shocks con-
tainted in ²t. Recall that there are 16 different regimes. Let the smoothed regime probability
for regime i, with a slight abuse of notation, be denoted by Pi,t. That is, Pi,t = P [St = i|It] .
Because regimes are unobserved, the residuals are essentially unobservable to the econo-
metrician. We therefore use the econometrician’s best estimate for the residuals given full
sample information and the smoothed probabilities, that is, using equation (16):
²¯t =
S∑
i=1
(Γ(St = i))
−1
[
Xt − Ω1(St)Xft−1 − Ω2(St)Xft − Ω3(St)Xt−1
]
Pi,t
We denote the regime-dependent variance covariance matrix for these residual, again
with a slight abuse of notation by Vt, that is:
Vt =
S∑
i=1
Σ(St = i)Pi,t
We perform our different tests on the standardized residuals zt = V
− 1
2
t ²¯t. We test for a zero
mean and no second-order correlation by testing whether or not b1, b2, and b3 are zero in:
E [zt]− b1 = 0 (C-2)
E [(zt − b1) (zt−1 − b1)]− b2 = 0 (C-3)
E [(zt − b1) (zt−2 − b1)]− b3 = 0 (C-4)
Define zˆt = (zt − b1)2 − 1. We test for a well-specified variance by testing whether or not
b4, b5,and b6 are equal to zero in:
E [zˆt]− b4 = 0
E [zˆtzˆt−1]− b5 = 0
E [zˆtzˆt−2]− b6 = 0
We test for excess skewness and kurtosis by testing whether or not b7 and b8 are equal to
zero in:
E
[
(zt − b1)3
]− b7 = 0 (C-5)
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E
[
(zt − b1)4 − 3
]− b8 = 0 (C-6)
We estimate b1 to b8 using GMM with a Newey and West (1987) weighting matrix with
number of lags equal to 5. The tests for zero mean, unit variance, zero skewness, and zero
excess kurtosis follow a χ2 (1) distribution, the tests for second order autocorrelation a χ2 (2)
distribution. The joint mean and variance tests follow a χ2 (3) distribution. We also perform
a small sample analysis of the test statistics. For each series, we use the estimated parameters
from the model to simulate a time-series of similar length as our sample. For 500 of such
simulated time-series, we calculate the test statistics, and use the resulting distribution to
derive empirical probability values.
To investigate whether our model adequately captures the covariance between the factor
shocks, we test whether the following conditions hold:
E [zl,tzj,t] = 0, for l, j ∈ {yt, pit, it} ; l 6= j.
We test for each of the 3 variables whether its shocks have a zero covariance with the two
other shocks. This test follows a χ2 distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. In addition,
we report the joint test for the covariances between all factor shocks which follows a χ2
distribution with 3 degrees of freedom. Our p-values results from a small sample analysis of
the test statistics, analogous to that performed for the univariate tests.
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D Impulse Response Analysis
Recall from equation (8) that the forward solution of the REE can be characterized as follows:
Xt = Ω
∗(St)Xt−1 + Γ∗(St)²t ²t ∼ N(0,Σ(St)).
Conditional on time t information including St, the one-step ahead prediction of Xt+1 is
given by EtXt+1 = F (St, 1)Xt where F (St, 1) = E[Ω
∗(St+1)|St]. The k-step ahead prediction
of Xt is then, computed recursively as EtXt+k = F (St, k)Xt where F (St, 0) = I3 and
F (St, k) = E[F (St+1, k − 1)Ω∗(St+1)|St],
for k ≥ 1. The initial value of Xt is given by Γ∗(St)²t. Therefore, the impulse responses of
Xt+k to the initial innovation at time t conditional on St are expressed as:
IR(St, k) = F (St, k)Γ
∗(St)²t, (D-7)
which is just a function of the current state St. Note that the volatility regimes simply
determine the initial size of a given shock and do not affect the impulse response dynamics.
Therefore, the relevant regime variable in F (St, k)Γ
∗(St) is St = s
mp
t . For instance, in the
case of a supply shock and the initial volatility regime being 1, we can set ²t = (σAS(s
pi
t =
1) 0 0)′. Therefore, the impulse-response analysis only needs to consider regime-switching in
the monetary policy stance. For each shock, there are two impulse responses starting from
the initial monetary policy regime, depending on the volatility regime of the shock.
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E Computing the Unconditional Variance and its De-
composition conditional on Regimes
In this appendix, we show how to compute the unconditional and regime-dependent variances
of Xt, implied by the rational expectations solution of the model. For expositional purposes,
we rewrite equation (8) as follows:
Xt = Ω(St)Xt−1 + V (St)ut ut ∼ N(0, I3), (E-8)
where V (St) = Γ(St)Σ
1/2(St). To compute the variance of Xt, we first define the regime
variable St, the corresponding transition probability matrix and its ergodic probabilities.
Recall that the regime variable St comprises 4 different regime variables St = (s
mp
t , s
pi
t , s
y
t , s
i
t),
each potentially taking on 2 states. Thus the variable St has 16 different states, indexed in
the following way:
St s
mp
t s
pi
t s
y
t s
i
t St s
mp
t s
pi
t s
y
t s
i
t
1 (A H H H) 9 (P H H H)
2 (A H H L) 10 (P H H L)
3 (A H L H) 11 (P H L H)
4 (A H L L) 12 (P H L L)
5 (A L H H) 13 (P L H H)
6 (A L H L) 14 (P L H L)
7 (A L L H) 15 (P L L H)
8 (A L L L) 16 (P L L L)
where A and P stand for ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary policy regimes.; H and L stand for
‘high’ and ‘low’ volatility regimes for supply, demand and monetary policy shocks, respec-
tively.
Because the 4 regime variables are assumed independent, the transition probabilities
for St are easily computed from the underlying transition probabilities for the 4 separate
regime probabilities. Let St = i correspond to (s
mp
t , s
pi
t , s
y
t , s
i
t) = (i1, i2, i3, i4) where i1 =A
or P, i2, i3, i4 = H or L. The state St = j is defined analogously. Then, the transition
probability of switching from i to j, Pij ≡ Pr(St = j|St−1 = i) for i, j = 1, ..., 16 is given by
Pij = P
mp
i1,j1
×P pii2,j2×P yi3,j3×P ii4,j4 . If the regime-switching model is ergodic, the unconditional
probabilities, denoted by Pi = Pr(St = i), satisfy
S∑
i=1
PijPi = Pj,
S∑
i=1
Pi = 1
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where S = 16 and i, j = 1, 2, ..., S.
Now multiply with X ′t on both sides of (E-8) and take expectations conditional on the
state St = i:
E[XtX
′
t|St = i] = Ω(St = i)E[Xt−1X ′t−1|St = i]Ω′(St = i) + V (St = i)V ′(St = i) (E-9)
as Xt−1 and ut are independent. Since there is no drift term in our model, E[XtX ′t|St = i] is
the variance of Xt conditional on St = i, V ar(Xt|St = i). Following Ang, Bekaert, and Wei
(2008), E[Xt−1X ′t−1|St = i] can be written as:
E[Xt−1X ′t−1|St = i] =
S∑
j=1
E[Xt−1X ′t−1|St−1 = j] Pr(St−1 = j|St = i)
=
S∑
j=1
E[Xt−1X ′t−1|St−1 = j]
Pr(St−1 = j)
Pr(St = i)
Pr(St = i|St−1 = j)
=
S∑
j=1
E[Xt−1X ′t−1|St−1 = j]
Pj
Pi
Pji
Plugging this expression into (E-9), we have
E[XtX
′
t|St = i] = Ω(i)
(
S∑
j=1
E[Xt−1X ′t−1|St−1 = j]
Pj
Pi
Pji
)
Ω′(i) + V (i)V ′(i) (E-10)
where Ω(i) = Ω(St = i) and V (i) = V (St = i).
In order to obtain a closed form expression for E[XtX
′
t|St = i], we define vx and v as
follows:
vx =

vec(E[XtX
′
t|St = 1])
vec(E[XtX
′
t|St = 2])
...
vec(E[XtX
′
t|St = 16])
 , v =

vec(V (1)V ′(1))
vec(V (2)V ′(2))
...
vec(V (16)V ′(16))

Then, equation (E-9) for all i = 1, ..., S can be expressed as:
vx = ΣΩvx + v, (E-11)
where (i, j)-th element of the matrix ΣΩ is given by:
ΣΩij = [
Pj
Pi
PjiΩ(i)⊗ Ω(i)].
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Therefore, vx = (In2S − ΣΩ)−1v where n = 3. By reshaping vx back into a matrix form, we
have the formula for E[XtX
′
t|St = i] for all i = 1, 2, ..., S. Finally, V ar(Xt) = E(XtX ′t) can
be obtained as:
V ar(Xt) = E(XtX
′
t) = E (E[XtX
′
t|St])
=
S∑
i=1
E[XtX
′
t|St = i] · Pi
=
S∑
i=1
V ar[Xt|St = i] · Pi.
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Table 1: Specification Tests on Model Residuals
This table reports Monte-Carlo p-values for the different specification tests described in Appendix
B. For both the Rational Expectations and Unconstrained Model, the univariate tests test for a zero
mean, no second order autocorrelation, zero skewness, and no excess kurtosis in the standardized
residuals of the output, inflation, and interest rate equations. The bottom panel reports Monte-
Carlo p-values for a test of zero covariances of the factor shocks of one state variable with the
factor shocks of the other two state variables, as well as a joint test that all covariances are equal
to zero.
Rational Expectations Model Unconstrained Model
Univariate Tests Output Inflation Short Rate Output Inflation Short Rate
Mean Test
Zero mean 0.560 0.855 0.905 0.377 0.559 0.807
Autocorrelation 0.000 0.930 0.926 0.000 0.119 0.839
Joint 0.000 0.985 0.976 0.000 0.250 0.933
Variance Test
Unit Variance 0.771 0.684 0.907 0.294 0.552 0.743
Autocorrelation 0.057 0.739 0.485 0.907 0.502 0.504
Joint 0.382 0.845 0.451 0.771 0.536 0.208
Test on Higher Moments
Zero Skewness 0.221 0.033 0.281 0.365 0.450 0.433
Zero Excess Kurtosis 0.861 0.251 0.643 0.853 0.480 0.694
Covariance Tests
Covar shocks with other 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.001 0.000 0.038
Joint 0.000 0.000
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates Rational Expectations Model
This table reports the estimation results of the Rational Expectations Model with independent
regimes in respectively the monetary policy parameters β and γ, the volatility of inflation shocks
²ASt , the volatility of output shocks ²ISt , and the volatility of monetary policy shocks ²MPt , as
outlined in Section 2. The regime-switching variables are respectively denoted as smpt , spit , s
y
t , and
sit. Panel 1 reports the parameters of the AS and IS equation. Panel 2 reports the monetary pol-
icy parameters. Panel 3 shows the regime-switching volatilies of respectively the inflation shocks
(σAS(spit )), the output shocks (σIS(s
y
t )), and the interest rate shocks (σMP (sit)) (on a quarterly
basis). Panel 4 reports the transition probabilities for the four independent regime-switching vari-
ables. Panel 5 reports the alpha parameter. Standard errors are reported between parentheses. For
the regime-switching parameters, we also report p-values for a Wald test of equality across regimes
between square brackets.
1. Output Gap and Inflation Parameters
δ λ µ φ
0.425 0.102 0.675 0.100
(0.065) (0.044) (0.030) -
2. Monetary Policy Parameters
ρ β(smpt = 1) β(s
mp
t = 2) γ(s
mp
t = 1) γ(s
mp
t = 2)
0.834 2.312 0.598 1.187 0.687
(0.022) (0.182) (0.140) (0.414) (0.111)
[0.001] [0.217]
3. Volatilities
σAS(s
pi
t = 1) σAS(s
pi
t = 2) σIS(s
y
t = 1) σIS(s
y
t = 2) σMP (s
i
t = 1) σMP (s
i
t = 2)
0.334 0.162 0.142 0.072 0.249 0.041
(0.051) (0.044) (0.031) (0.007) (0.021) (0.007)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
4. Transition Probabilities 5. Alpha
Pmp11 P
mp
22 P
pi
11 P
pi
22 α
0.878 0.957 0.991 0.980 0.986
(0.108) (0.036) (0.012) (0.028) (0.020)
P y11 P
y
22 P (s
i
t) Q(s
i
t)
0.963 0.984 0.893 0.843
(0.047) (0.015) (0.045) (0.057)
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Table 3: Variance Decompositions and Ergodic Distribution for all Regimes
This table reports the ergodic distribution and the variance decomposition results. In the first and
sixth columns, A and P stand for ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary policy regimes. H and L stand
for ‘high’ and ‘low’ volatility regimes for supply, demand and monetary policy shocks, respectively.
The 2nd and 7th columns show the probability of each regime in the ergodic distribution, which
measures the unconditional probability of each regime combination. The 3rd through 5th, and 8th
through 10th columns report the ratio of the variance of each variable conditional on a regime
combination to its total variance, in percent. That is, all columns add up to 100.
(smpt ,s
pi
t , s
y
t , s
i
t) Pi rpi ry ri (s
mp
t ,s
pi
t , s
y
t , s
i
t) Pi rpi ry ri
(A, H, H, H), 3.23 1.24 1.98 3.17 (P, H, H, H) 9.16 14.24 14.31 12.08
(A, H, H, L) 2.20 0.79 1.23 1.96 (P, H, H, L) 6.24 8.61 6.52 7.51
(A, H, L, H) 7.46 2.86 4.35 7.26 (P, H, L, H) 21.17 32.89 32.18 27.83
(A, H, L, L) 5.09 1.82 2.68 4.50 (P, H, L, L) 14.43 19.88 14.46 17.30
(A, L, H, H) 1.45 0.24 0.50 0.71 (P, L, H, H) 4.12 3.25 4.56 2.86
(A, L, H, L) 0.99 0.14 0.28 0.40 (P, L, H, L) 2.81 1.72 1.65 1.62
(A, L, L, H) 3.36 0.55 1.05 1.62 (P, L, L, H) 9.53 7.49 10.13 6.56
(A, L, L, L) 2.29 0.32 0.59 0.90 (P, L, L, L) 6.49 3.96 3.54 3.72
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Table 4: Ratio of Regime-Dependent Variances and Unconditional Variances in each regime
This table shows the ratio of the variance of a given variable (pi: inflation, y: output gap and i:
interest rate) conditional on a given regime to the unconditional variance of that variable implied
by the model. Each regime combines systematic monetary policy (A: active, P: passive) and regime
shock size for the three shocks (H: high, L: low). In the last line, we divide the ratio of the all-high-
shock regime by the all-low-shock regime, for both active and passive monetary policy regimes.
(smpt ,s
pi
t , s
y
t , s
i
t) rpi ry ri (s
mp
t ,s
pi
t , s
y
t , s
i
t) rpi ry ri
(A, H, H, H), 0.25 0.36 0.55 (P, H, H, H) 1.65 1.67 1.42
(A, H, H, L) 0.20 0.25 0.39 (P, H, H, L) 1.16 0.89 0.97
(A, H, L, H) 0.27 0.40 0.64 (P, H, L, H) 1.92 1.90 1.73
(A, H, L, L) 0.22 0.27 0.45 (P, H, L, L) 1.34 1.01 1.18
(A, L, H, H) 0.08 0.18 0.23 (P, L, H, H) 0.73 1.07 0.62
(A, L, H, L) 0.06 0.11 0.13 (P, L, H, L) 0.42 0.42 0.37
(A, L, L, H) 0.09 0.18 0.26 (P, L, L, H) 0.86 1.16 0.76
(A, L, L, L) 0.07 0.10 0.15 (P, L, L, L) 0.50 0.45 0.46
(H,H,H) vs (L,L,L) 3.57 3.60 3.67 (H,H,H) vs (L,L,L) 3.30 3.71 3.09
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Table 5: Ratio of Passive and Active Regime-Dependent Variances
This table shows the ratio between the regime dependent variances conditional on the passive mon-
etary policy regime and those conditional on the active monetary policy regime, for all variables.
(smpt ,s
pi
t , s
y
t , s
i
t) rpi ry ri
(P, H, H, H)/(A, H, H, H) 6.71 4.62 2.56
(P, H, H, L)/(A, H, H, L) 5.73 3.56 2.49
(P, H, L, H)/(A, H, L, H) 7.11 4.75 2.72
(P, H, L, L)/(A, H, L, L) 6.11 3.79 2.65
(P, L, H, H)/(A, L, H, H) 8.84 5.94 2.69
(P, L, H, L)/(A, L, H, L) 7.19 3.74 2.83
(P, L, L, H)/(A, L, L, H) 9.27 6.55 2.91
(P, L, L, L)/(A, L, L, L) 7.67 4.48 3.06
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Table 7: Estimation Results for Unconstrained Regime-Switching Macro Model with gamma
regime-switching and phi equal to 0.10
This table reports the estimation results of the unrestricted New-Keynesian Model with indepen-
dent regimes in respectively the monetary policy parameters β and γ, the volatility of inflation
shocks ²ASt , the volatility of output shocks ²ISt , and the volatility of monetary policy shocks ²MPt ,
as outlined in Section 2. The regime-switching variables are respectively denoted as smpt , spit , s
y
t ,
and sit. Panel 1 reports the parameters of the AS and IS equation. Panel 2 reports the monetary
policy parameters. Panel 3 shows the regime-switching volatilies of respectively the inflation shocks
(σAS(spit )), the output shocks (σIS(s
y
t )), and the interest rate shocks (σMP (sit)) (on a quarterly
basis). Panel 4 reports the transition probabilities for the four independent regime-switching vari-
ables. Panel 5 reports the alpha parameter. Standard errors are reported between parentheses. For
the regime-switching parameters, we also report p-values for a Wald test of equality across regimes
between square brackets.
1. Output Gap and Inflation Parameters
δ λ µ φ
0.351 0.076 0.331 0.100
(0.070) (0.031) (0.048) -
2. Monetary Policy Parameters
ρ β(smpt = 1) β(s
mp
t = 2) γ(s
mp
t = 1) γ(s
mp
t = 2)
0.871 2.164 0.210 1.335 0.748
(0.020) (0.250) (0.192) (0.328) (0.138)
3. Volatilities
σAS(s
pi
t = 1) σAS(s
pi
t = 2) σIS(s
y
t = 1) σIS(s
y
t = 2) σMP (s
i
t = 1) σMP (s
i
t = 2)
0.316 0.137 0.092 0.050 0.253 0.038
(0.034) (0.026) (0.010) (0.023) (0.040) (0.004)
4. Transition Probabilities 5. Alpha
Pmp11 P
mp
22 P
pi
11 P
pi
22 α
0.841 0.936 0.990 0.973 0.410
(0.095) (0.032) (0.011) (0.024) (0.066)
P y11 P
y
22 P
i
11 P
i
22
0.973 0.959 0.891 0.837
(0.080) (0.116) (0.057) (0.061)
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Figure 1: Smoothed Regime Probabilities (Rational Expectations Model)
This figure shows the smoothed probabilities of the regimes in the general regime-switching New-
Keynesian Macro model with four independent regime variables. Panel A shows the smoothed
probabilities of respectively the high inflation shock volatility regime and the high output shock
volatility regime. Panel B shows the smoothed probabilities of respectively the active monetary
policy regimel, and the high interest rate shock volatility regime. NBER recessions are shaded gray.
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to AS Shocks
This figure shows the impulse responses of inflation, the output gap and the short-term interest rate
to the AS shock implied by our structural regime switching model. Each panel plots the responses
of each variable dependent on a given monetary policy and shock regime. MP1 (MP2) represents
the estimated stabilizing (accommodating) monetary policy reaction function, whereas σ1 (σ2) is
the estimated high (low) shock.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to IS Shocks
This figure shows the impulse responses of inflation, the output gap and the short-term interest rate
to the IS shock implied by our structural regime switching model. Each panel plots the responses
of each variable dependent on a given monetary policy and shock regime. MP1 (MP2) represents
the estimated stabilizing (accommodating) monetary policy reaction function, whereas σ1 (σ2) is
the estimated high (low) shock.
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to MP Shocks
This figure shows the impulse responses of inflation, the output gap and the short-term interest
rate to the MP shock implied by our structural regime switching model. Each panel plots the
responses of each variable dependent on a given monetary policy and shock regime. MP1 (MP2)
represents the estimated stabilizing (accommodating) monetary policy reaction function, whereas
σ1 (σ2) is the estimated high (low) shock.
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Figure 8: Smoothed Regime Probabilities (Unconstrained Model)
This figure plots the volatility ratio between the unconditional volatility of each of the macro
variables, and their counterfactual volatility, conditional on the monetary policy regime always
being in the active regime.
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